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Abstract—For computer software, our security models, poli-
cies, mechanisms, and means of assurance were primarily con-
ceived and developed before the end of the 1970’s. However,
since that time, software has changed radically: it is thousands
of times larger, comprises countless libraries, layers, and services,
and is used for more purposes, in far more complex ways. It is
worthwhile to revisit our core computer security concepts. For
example, it is unclear whether the Principle of Least Privilege
can help dictate security policy, when software is too complex for
either its developers or its users to explain its intended behavior.
One possibility is to take an empirical, data-driven approach
to modern software, and determine its exact, concrete behavior
via comprehensive, online monitoring. Such an approach can be
a practical, effective basis for security—as demonstrated by its
success in spam and abuse fighting—but its use to constrain
software behavior raises many questions. In particular, three
questions seem critical. First, can we efficiently monitor the
details of how software is behaving, in the large? Second, is it
possible learn those details without intruding on users’ privacy?
Third, are those details a good foundation for security policies
that constrain how software should behave?
This paper outlines what a data-driven model for software
security could look like, and describes how the above three
questions can be answered affirmatively. Specifically, this paper
briefly describes methods for efficient, detailed software monitor-
ing, as well as methods for learning detailed software statistics
while providing differential privacy for its users, and, finally, how
machine learning methods can help discover users’ expectations
for intended software behavior, and thereby help set security
policy. Those methods can be adopted in practice, even at very
large scales, and demonstrate that data-driven software security
models can provide real-world benefits.
I. INTRODUCTION
The core concepts of computer security have remained
mostly the same since they were developed and articulated
in the 1970’s and late 1960’s, e.g., in the seminal papers
on protection by Lampson and by Saltzer and Schroeder [1],
[2]. However, since then, surprisingly little progress has been
made in increasing the practical security of computer users,
especially compared to the exponential improvements in other
aspects of computing during the same time. Indeed, by most
measures, the problems of computer security have grown
progressively worse over those decades, even though a plethora
of computer security mechanisms has been developed and
deployed, and the use of technologies such as advanced
cryptography has become ubiquitous.
Today’s computer users suffer every year some inconve-
nience or damage as a result of computer security issues,
as their personal information is stolen from their devices or
vulnerable databases, as their computers are infected with
Security policy = Functional specification
Security mechanism = Software implementation
Security assurance = Program correctness
Security model = Programming methodology
Fig. 1. The correspondence between aspects of computer security and
computer software, the last one an addition to those identified by Lampson [5].
unwanted software or harvested into botnets, or simply as
their credit cards or vehicles are recalled because of a security
breach or vulnerability. It’s therefore worthwhile to consider
approaches to computer security based on new foundations—
although any such effort must acknowledge that security is too
intricate and pervasive a problem to admit a panacea.
This short position paper presents a data-driven software
security model that is founded on an abstraction of empirical
programs, which pairs software with data on all security-
relevant events in all of its execution traces.
Enforcing this data-driven model will, for example, nat-
urally disallow network access by the Microsoft Windows
Solitaire game [3] and also disallow messages that trigger the
Heartbleed vulnerability [4]. In the model, security policies
are automatically derived from historical evidence, and the
Solitaire game doesn’t use the Windows networking libraries,
even though it includes them, and no naturally-occurring TLS
heartbeat messages with huge payloads have ever existed.
This paper further motivates and describes this data-driven
model of software security, and gives examples of practical,
useful methods for its application.
A. Security Models and the Difficulty of Setting Policies
It is not a new observation that we have made disappoint-
ingly little progress in secure computing. In a series of talks
and papers around the turn of the millennium, Butler Lampson,
one of the founding figures in computer security, gave a good
overview of the field, its aspirations and promise, and its
failures in practice [5]. In this work, Lampson convincingly
explains the difficulties of computer security, e.g., how it is
even harder than traditional security because universal net-
working has created an unbounded set of would-be attackers,
and because computers’ precise, faithful execution implies that
exploits can only be stopped by fully guaranteeing the absence
of vulnerabilities.
Most importantly, Lampson draws the correspondence,
shown in Figure 1, between security policies, mechanisms, and
assurance and the more general pursuit of program correctness
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2Permit only low-level executions that programmers intended to be possible,
unless given explicit, special permission.
Fig. 2. The general maxim of the widely-used programmer-intent software security model, as applied to security-relevant events during software execution.
(i.e., establishing that software correctly implements a speci-
fication). To his list, Figure 1 adds a correspondence between
security models, such as access-control lists, capabilities, or
information-flow tracking, and different programming method-
ologies, such as imperative or functional programming, logical
or declarative formalisms, or reactive software modules. Like
programming paradigms, security models can be best seen as
alternative means towards the same end (at least, if we follow
Lampson and ignore general non-interference, etc. [6]). Tasks
and approaches easy in one Turing-complete language may
be difficult in another, and the same holds true for security
models, which, in general, can restrict executions only to the
same set of enforceable security policies [7].
Lampson’s correspondence highlights how the definition
of the right security policy—which can be enforced with
assurance by the selected mechanisms—is the key obstacle
to creating secure software. Software developers are famously
loath to fully specify their intended functionality, and infa-
mously likely to get such specifications wrong, when forced
to create them; furthermore, only recently has it become prac-
tically feasible to guarantee program correctness for simple
software [8]. Figure 1 identifies security policy as just a form
of specification, albeit one that is particularly crucial and
hard to get right. It can only be in vain hope that we ask
software developers, administrators, or users to define security
policy and select enforcement mechanisms, when the more
fundamental, and much better understood, task of creating
software that correctly performs its task has proven to be such
an insurmountable challenge.
Depending on the task at hand, and the guarantees needed,
certain security models and mechanisms may be particularly
well-suited to provide assurance, just as software may be best
implemented using a certain methodology. Security policies
can range widely in their intent and granularity, like any other
form of software specification, and for some purposes it can
be simple to derive and set the intended policy. For example,
simple prohibitions of permitted information-flow can compre-
hensively protect secrecy, just as declaratively implementing
functionality in Datalog can fully ensure decidability. Security
models that enable simple, useful security policies for large
classes of software are clearly advantageous, even though their
simplicity will prevent such models from addressing many
real-world security concerns.
A particularly important security model that admits simple
policies is one that encompasses mechanisms to thwart the
exploits of low-level software vulnerabilities.
B. Automatically-derived Policies for Low-level Software
Over the last couple of decades, stack-based buffer over-
flows and memory-corruption vulnerabilities have become a
primary exploit vector and a critical software security issue.
In defending against such attacks, the security model out-
lined in Figure 2 has been particularly effective at defin-
ing simple, useful security policies that successfully prevent
exploits. In this security model—here termed “programmer-
intent software security”—security policies are automatically
derived from software source code (or binaries) by identifying
simple program properties that are obviously true, based on
the programming-language abstractions and semantics and the
clear intent of the programmers.
This security model has been instantiated multiple times,
for example by placing canaries or cookies on the execution
stack to preserve the programmer-intended integrity of func-
tion return-address values, or by introducing artificial hetero-
geneity and randomness to capture an intent that programs
be insensitive to the concrete representation of values like
pointers [9]. Those instantiations have adhered to the maxim
of Figure 2 and have had to explicitly permit only a handful
of special cases, e.g., for dynamic loading and libraries and
signal delivery. Unfortunately, many of those instantiations tie
policy and mechanism too closely and intricately together for
the underlying model to be clearly identifiable.
The clearest examples of this security model is the work to
enforce the programmer’s intended control and data flow that
is often termed Control-Flow Integrity (CFI) and Data-Flow
Integrity (DFI) [10], [11], [12], [13], [14], [15]. In that work,
it is clear how different security policies of varying granularity
can be automatically derived from the software itself, and
how those policies can (greatly) constrain the attacker from
exploiting low-level vulnerabilities. Those policies can operate
at different levels of abstraction and aim to enforce a detailed
abstract model of the program with full precision, or make
only binary, coarse-grained distinctions between code or data,
or even leave certain activity completely unconstrained. For
example, some CFI mechanisms apply only to C++ VTables,
but do so precisely, whereas others apply to all indirect control
flow in a very coarse manner; similarly, data-flow integrity
mechanisms differ in their abstractions, with some based on
data allocation but others on read/write patterns, etc.
The great advantage of these control-flow and data-flow
security mechanisms is that their policy is dictated by the
already-written software program. In no case is the user
required to specify policy details: they must simply choose
between security policies with different enforcement mech-
anisms, and different levels of assurance. Of course, that
choice may still be challenging, because a wide variety of
mechanisms exists—ranging from binary-translation emula-
tors to highly-optimized compiler-inserted inline guards—with
greatly differing software-engineering and performance char-
acteristics. Furthermore, the parameters of each mechanism are
likely tweakable, e.g., to change the level of precision or make
other tradeoffs. Finally, only some of those mechanisms will
attempt to provide high assurance, such as those that verify
the static CFI properties of the final binary [16]. However,
3Permit only executions that historical evidence shows to be common enough,
unless given explicit, special permission.
Fig. 3. The general maxim of the data-driven software security model of this paper, as applied to security-relevant events during software execution.
Fig. 4. Data-driven software security tied to access control, as per [5].
these are easily-made, commonplace engineering tradeoffs,
compared to the primary obstacle of writing security policies
or program specifications identified by Lampson.
Mechanisms that embody this programmer-intent security
model are now used near universally, in one form or another,
undoubtedly due to their lack of user-specified security poli-
cies. However, at best, application of this model removes just
one set of vulnerabilities—approximately the ones eliminated
by a rigorously type-safe programming language—and leaves
unremedied other vulnerabilities, such as actual logic errors
made by programmers. It is worthwhile to consider other
ways in which useful, practical security policies can be de-
fined without user specification, e.g., by automatically basing
such policies on the experience gathered from absolutely all
executions of a software program.
II. A DATA-DRIVEN SOFTWARE SECURITY MODEL
Let’s posit that software programs could be accompanied by
a comprehensive summary of all executions of that program,
detailing the program’s historical behavior in every instance.
Indeed, let’s define a new abstraction of an empirical pro-
gram as the static software program (e.g., its source code
or executable text) coupled with the multiset of all of its
execution traces. Those traces would be captured at some level
of granularity and, for the purposes of security, may include
only security-relevant execution events.
Since modern software is generally online—to receive se-
curity updates, if nothing else—the practical implementation
of this empirical program abstraction is not a farfetched idea.
Such an abstraction would naturally support the security
model outlined in Figure 3, which simply prohibits all novel,
security-relevant behavior, unless especially permitted. This
model could, by default, prevent many software attacks, such
as privilege-escalation exploits of the vulnerabilities regularly
discovered in esoteric operating system services. Most re-
cently, this model’s enforcement would have blocked exploits
of the CVE-2016-0728 vulnerability by prohibiting use of the
Linux keyctl system call in commonly-used applications,
since historical evidence would have shown that this software
never used keyctl or kernel keyrings.
Fig. 5. Data-driven software security tied to information flow, as per [5].
Of course, to apply this model in a practical security
enforcement mechanism, there are a number of obstacles
and naturally-arising questions. For example, what security
policy should be enforced on the first program execution?
But, whatever the obstacles, the data-driven security model
of Figure 3 is attractive for many reasons. In particular, it
seems like a natural basis for software security enforcement
to consider how that software has behaved in the past, overall
(cf., state-based security enforcement that considers only the
current execution [17]). Also, as shown in Figures 4 and 5,
this model can be naturally combined with existing security
models, by simply ensuring that operations proceed and infor-
mation flows in accordance with historical audit logs (thereby
raising the importance of audit to parity with the other aspects
of Lampson’s Gold Standard [5]).
Crucially, this data-driven security shares with programmer-
intent security the great advantage that policy is primarily
dictated by the already-written (and -executed) empirical pro-
grams. Therefore, policies can be simple and easy to specify.
The primary parameters of data-driven security policies
would be the event abstraction used in execution traces—
for example, network service requests, API or system calls,
function calls, or simply security privileges—as well as the
historical frequency by which security-relevant events must
have been seen, to be permitted in the current execution.
Although historical evidence may be interpreted in myriad
ways (e.g., using elaborate machine learning), efficiency and
robustness concerns are likely to favor simpler methods (e.g.,
utilizing the set of observed events, not their sequences).
For clarity, this position paper considers only security-
related events, such as system calls, which can be easily
summarized and combined using set-theoretic operations. An
event is considered to be supported by historical evidence if
it has occurred at least once (or k times for some fixed, low
threshold k) in the execution traces; otherwise, it is prohibited
by the security policy. Security policies that such sets of
permitted operations to reduce software attack surface have
proven to be of great practical value, e.g., in network firewalls
and operating-system sandboxing [18].
Simple, data-driven software security policies can be partic-
4ularly well suited to large-scale, popular software applications,
which are typically bloated in size, composed of innumerable
platforms, modules, and libraries, and full of arcane or unused
functionality. In such commonly-used software there exist
many dusty corners with lurking vulnerabilities, as well as
embedded interpreters, dynamic-library loaders, and reflection
APIs that attackers can exploit to perform arbitrary behavior.
Simply disallowing previously-unseen security-relevant events
can effectively thwart such attacks, and for widely-used soft-
ware that can be a strong basis of historical evidence from an
abundance of execution traces.
Of course, data-driven security is not a panacea, and its
limitations, obstacles, and open questions must be carefully
considered. However, as outlined above, data-driven security
enforcement can provide significant benefits, at least for the
commonly-used software that most affects users.
A. Differences from Anomaly and Intrusion Detection
The most prominent past attempts at automatically deriving
security policies from execution traces have centered on the
techniques of anomaly detection and software intrusion detec-
tion. Although the details differ, the common idea in this work
is to use a set of traces collected from benign training runs (or
trial runs) to determine what constitutes “normal” executions,
and enforce compliance to this security policy during a later
operational phase [19], [20]. Because software tends to have a
long tail of possible behaviors and these techniques use only
a partial set of training traces (e.g., from a special training
phase), they invariably suffer from a great number of false
reports when deployed in practice. As a result, they have seen
limited practical use, except as voluminous but helpful warning
notifications for manual operators.
Comprehensiveness: This paper’s data-driven software
security model relies on the empirical program abstraction to
avoid such falsely-reported security violations. By definition,
empirical programs include all execution traces, not just
those from training runs. Those traces should also include all
executions performed during the software’s development and
testing, which should ensure that any latent, actual software
feature will be represented, even for the first use of unpopular
software. The long-tail behavior of commonly-used software
should be particularly transparent—or so it would seem—since
their policies could summarize billions of execution traces.
Level of abstraction: For the above to hold true, the
abstractions and methods used for data-driven security policies
must be chosen carefully. They cannot, in particular, be so
fine-grained that they include user-specific behavior that is
orthogonal to the software’s semantics. For example, security
policies based on the content of user input to text-editing
software, or the URL bar of a Web browser, would be likely
guaranteed to trigger false errors in the future. Therefore, data-
driven security is best based on simpler, coarser abstractions,
such as sets of system calls used in this paper, perhaps
augmented with invariants on parameter values and their
magnitudes. Techniques for selecting such abstractions can
be built on the foundation of inferring convergent software
invariants [21], [22].
Development-process integration: Also, data-driven se-
curity techniques must be at least partially integrated into
engineering processes and preferably used throughout the
software development lifecycle. For example, test coverage
analysis could be used to determine when security policies are
comprehensive and permissive enough to allow wide software
deployment. Fuzzing, concolic execution, or other automated
testing techniques could be used to increase coverage (e.g., as
in [23]). However, care would have to be taken, or software
with embedded interpreters or other general-purpose modules
might be found to exhibit all possible behaviors.
Such software-engineering integration would also be invalu-
able in maintaining security policies as software is updated
for security, stability, or behavior (which can be frequent in
modern software), or is given the occasional major upgrade.
(Of course, a proper accounting of software updates would
require redefining the empirical program abstraction to account
for differences in versions over time.) Most importantly, the
maintenance of data-driven security policies would have to be
integrated into software development, with the deployment of
new, summarized security policy treated as a form of software
security update.
Real-world execution traces: No matter how software de-
velopment is performed, there is no substitute for the evidence
from real-world execution traces in the crafting of data-driven
security policies. Testing is at best partial, and software is often
used for unanticipated purposes in unexpected configurations;
no testing framework can hope to replicate all end-user activity
and the environments that may affect software execution. It is
inevitable that some execution paths will be seen first during
real-world execution (e.g., it’s not hard to imagine that this
might be true for software-emulated denormal floating-point
computations). Furthermore, it may be important that security
policy disallow some behavior that is common during software
development, such as debugger- or automation-driven inputs;
otherwise, data-driven security policies might, by default, open
the door to cases like the well-known sendmail Debug script
vulnerability, CVE-1999-0095.
Context-specificity: To increase the precision of security
policies, execution traces can include information about en-
vironmental factors, such as time, locale, user preferences,
etc., which may affect software behavior in myriad ways.
For example, software execution may be highly dependent on
time: the Y2K bug and its effect comes to mind, as does end-
of-year processing in some business software. In this case,
one could hope this behavior had been captured in execution
traces during functionality or integration testing. More prob-
lematically, some software may contain functionality “easter
eggs” that were hidden even during software development. In
this latter case, one can ask whether software behavior that
has never been seen before, even during testing, should not
simply be counted as a bug, resulting in program termination;
certainly, software crashes often—without good reason—and
here at least there would be a good reason.
Remediation options: More generally, a range of remedial
actions may be taken upon violation of a data-driven security
policy. Fail-stop enforcement that halts execution may be
practical in many cases, e.g., for non-critical software that
5can be restarted by the user, and where data loss is not a
concern, as long as the software can be reset to avoid an
infinite loop of halting. Also, it may sometimes be practical to
simply ask the user whether to proceed, and summarize their
decisions to set future policy; a variant of this approach is used
for security-relevant permissions on some mobile phone and
Web platforms. Finally, even if execution is silently allowed to
proceed, both system administrators and software developers
could make good use of high-accuracy reports of software
exploits, e.g., to set firewall rules or develop security updates.
Remediation by silent alerts would blur the distinction with
traditional anomaly detection, except that data-driven security
enforcement should trigger vastly fewer alerts.
Deployment bootstrapping: Even when using silent
alerts, there should be no enforcement of data-driven security
policies until those policies have converged and stabilized,
through the summarization of sufficient real-world execution
traces. This is a key distinction between the data-driven
software security model and traditional anomaly detection. By
integrating with the software-development lifecycle, including
initial real-world use of the software, the process of converging
to stable security policies can be monitored and at some
point—after careful consideration using domain knowledge—
the switch must be flipped to start enforcing those policies.
Thus, data-driven enforcement won’t likely bring any secu-
rity benefits during software development, testing, and early
deployments; its benefits will accrue primarily after software
has become frequently-used enough, which, fortunately, is also
when its improved security will impact the most users.
B. Open Questions and Formal Modeling
There still remain open questions about this data-driven
software security model that cannot be answered here.
For example, if security policy is driven by real-world
execution traces, it is not difficult to imagine that attackers
might try to get malicious behavior classified as benign, e.g.,
by using a Sybil attack to facilitate Mimicry attacks [24],
[25]. In other contexts, such as crowd-sourced restaurant
reviews, those attacks are largely prevented by risk analysis
of registered user accounts. However, those attacks might be
devastating in a software context, especially where there is
no well-defined, accountable registry of users. Even so, in
some domains, such as datacenter computing, this obstacle can
clearly be overcome, e.g., by eliminating Sybils or managing
their number.
There also remain more formal questions about the model,
especially as regards to its empirical program abstraction.
From a formal-language perspective, programs can be seen as
language recognizers, and from this viewpoint the insecurity
of modern software partially stems from it recognizing too
large a set of inputs. An empirical program restricts the set of
recognized inputs by disallowing some events in execution
traces, at some levels of abstraction, while the static text
of the software itself implicitly defines a subset of allowed
events. Clearly, it would be helpful in applying the data-driven
software security model if there was a sound basis for formal
reasoning about empirical programs.
However, it is first necessary to establish that comprehensive
software execution tracing can be done, efficiently enough, in
practice, and used to derive data-driven policies that provide
useful security benefits.
III. METHODS FOR DATA-DRIVEN SOFTWARE SECURITY
Despite its relative simplicity and other attractive qualities,
a data-driven software security model is not likely to be
straightforward to apply, in most domains. For example, both
the crucial integration with software-engineering processes and
the deployment of mechanisms to construct and maintain se-
curity policy are likely to be major challenges, by themselves.
Also, it is still more of an art than science to select the
abstractions, granularity, and thresholds of empirical programs,
and to determine when trace data has converged into useful
security policies—requiring the skills of hard-to-find artisan
security engineers that are domain experts.
Even so, over the last few years, at Google we have
constructed several data-driven security mechanisms, and have
utilized them in various ways, as part of software products
and production infrastructure. Many of those mechanisms have
been experimental, but some have seen significant deployment.
This section describes three of those mechanisms, which
establish that execution traces can be collected with low-
enough overhead and in a way that protects end-user privacy,
and that those traces can be used to protect users’ security and
privacy in novel ways.
A. Efficient Monitoring of Software Execution Details
At Google, in work led by Michael Vrable, we have consid-
ered data-driven security policies about system-call behavior
for production software that runs in our datacenters. For such
software, the empirical program abstraction can be relatively
easily realized by integrating with Google’s test-driven de-
velopment and by collecting execution-trace summaries from
thousands of process instances. Also, fail-stop enforcement
can be particularly well-suited to fault-tolerant software, which
is designed to gracefully tolerate process failures and automat-
ically discard requests that trigger such failures.
Our experience has shown that system-call-trace-based se-
curity policies can be efficiently collected, summarized, and
enforced using standard technologies, such as ptrace and
seccomp_bpf on Linux—neither of which incurs any signif-
icant per-system-call cost, even if applied holistically as might
by done with a system-wide profiler [26].
We have developed further techniques for efficient tracing
at the level of functions, library routines, or network mes-
sages, based on reordering executable-binary code (including
message-marshaling code) such that execution of supposedly-
unused code can be blocked using operating-system memory
protection. Finally, we have created mechanisms to robustly
handle abrupt, unexpected changes in software behavior, and
the resulting storms of events and other disruptions. Therefore,
the data-driven security model can be realized efficiently, in
practice, at least for policies that involve sets of system calls
or sets of other support routines and services.
6Fig. 6. A representation of the system calls in an empirical program of a
large, feature-rich software service, drawn from concrete data on the first 200
seconds after startup. Above, the cumulative number of system calls used
converges to fewer than 80, out of the 300+ in Linux. Below, system call
use varies between initialization phases, with very few calls used in the final
production-service phase (only the first 9 system calls are represented).
Furthermore, our work has established that enforcement of
such policies can significantly reduce the attack surface that
is exposed to potentially-vulnerable software. When viewed
as an empirical program, even the most feature-rich software
makes a relatively modest use of underlying system services—
although the software may include code, modules, and libraries
for all possible functionality, as well as several kitchen sinks.
For example, the upper half of Figure 6 shows how,
empirically, one such program uses less than a third of the
Linux system calls. The lower half of Figure 6 also shows
how such software can exhibit phase-specific behavior that
can be used to improve security, e.g., by further constraining
policy after initialization, much as is done by the Chrome
Web browser [18]. Notably, in this case, the software made no
use of the keyctl call, so an automatically-derived security
policy would have prevented exploits of the CVE-2016-0728
vulnerability discussed on page 3.
B. Privacy-preserving Learning of Software Execution Data
Software monitoring can have privacy consequences for
users, even if it is not immediately apparent how the data
is privacy sensitive. Simply knowing that a software feature
has been active can have significant consequences—as is ef-
fectively demonstrated in television courtroom dramas, where
perpetrators are frequently found guilty based on evidence
from log records captured for benign purposes.
There are many possible methods that can protect the
privacy and anonymity of software users participating in the
collection of execution traces for empirical programs. For
example, data can be collected and combined using elaborate
cryptographic methods—such such as partially-homomorphic
Paillier encryption—or users can simply rely on Tor-like
network anonymization when providing trace data.
At Google, we have developed and deployed some particu-
larly attractive privacy-preserving technologies for monitoring
client data based on the the ideas of randomized response [27].
These technologies are available in the open-source RAPPOR
project, to be found at https://github.com/google/
rappor [27]. RAPPOR is already used, extensively, to gather
statistics about client-side values such as user-provided URL
domains in the Chrome Web browser.
RAPPOR can be easily applied to collect execution trace
data, while preserving both the privacy and anonymity of
users. In particular, for reports about the frequency of system
calls used by empirical programs it is sufficient to utilize
“basic RAPPOR”—a simple, binary form of randomized re-
sponse. Such reports would be low overhead, both in terms of
computation and their size, and can be easily aggregated into
data-driven security policies.
C. Matching User Expectations and Software Permissions
At Google, we have in the last few years developed tech-
niques for estimating how users expect software to behave, in
different aspects. This effort has been performed in the context
of online software markets, such as those that exist for mobile
phone and Web platforms. The goal has been to improve
the use of security-related permissions by software in thosse
markets by creating “peer groups” of similar software [28].
Our premise has been that users will expect similar behavior
from software that they perceive to offer similar functionality.
Recently, in work led by Martin Pelikan, we have gotten
very good results finding apparently-similar software using
modern machine-learning techniques—in particular, by using
word2vec skip-gram models on the data available about
different software, such as its descriptions and how users’
interact with the software in online markets. As a result, we
have been able to craft quite accurate software peer groups of
software that provides similar functionality, and thereby have
established a good basis of comparison from which to estimate
users’ expectation.
For the purposes of security, we have found that knowing
how users expect software to behave (or a good estimate
thereof) can provide many benefits. In particular, it allows
actual, concrete software behavior—such as that which might
be provided by an empirical program—to be compared against
users’ expectation. If there is a (large) discrepancy, a num-
ber of remedial approaches can be taken. Most notably, the
software developers can be notified, and asked to remedy
the situation; other alternatives include further automated or
manual review of the software, different handling of the
software in the market, or even asking users their opinion.
Some of those remedial approaches have been found suitable
for practical application, when measurements have proven
them to have clear benefits to users.
7IV. CONCLUSION
When deciding whether software should be permitted to
perform a security-relevant action, it seems like a good idea to
consider the historical evidence of what actions that software
has performed in the past. For popular, widely-used software,
there are literally billions of executions from which to draw
such historical evidence, thereby allowing a very accurate
view of what constitutes “normal” software execution to be
established. Furthermore, for the most part, this same software
is already networked, and could provide execution trace data
to online services that aggregated such evidence.
Motivated by the above, a distinct model for data-driven
software security can be established. This data-driven model is
different from the traditional approaches of anomaly and intru-
sion detection, e.g., in its comprehensiveness and integration
with software-development processes. This model immediately
raises concerns about efficiency, privacy, and practical utility,
but these concerns can be positively addressed, using existing
techniques and mechanisms.
While many questions remain about the model’s general
applicability and deployment, its enforcement could already
provide substantial security benefits to software that runs in
some important domains—by reducing its attack surface, and
thereby protecting the software in the same manner as firewalls
have very successfully protected networks.
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